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I. INTRODUCTION

It is fundamental to our system of justice and the primary goal of our
tort system that victims of negligent conduct be made whole through the
only means possible, monetary compensation.' To this end, in medical
* Frank A. Perrecone graduated with honors from Drake University School of Law and
practices law in Rockford, Illinois. He is a partner in the law firm of Ferolie & Perrecone,
Ltd., limiting his practice to personal injury and wrongful death. He is also an adjunct
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malpractice cases, just as in any bodily injury related tort case, plaintiffs
who establish a defendant's liability are entitled to recover for their medical
expenses, care-taking expenses, and loss of income, otherwise known as
economic damages. 2 Equally important, they are entitled to compensation
for human loss, the toll their injuries take on the quality of their lives in the
form of pain and suffering, disability and disfigurement. 3 When the injury
results in death, family members are entitled to compensation for the
bitterest harm of all: the loss of love and affection.4 These are otherwise
known as non-economic damages.
The insurance and medical industries have long contended that noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice jury trials, especially pain
and suffering, are responsible for the high cost of malpractice insurance for
physicians. They make sensational and inflammatory claims wholly
unsupported by empirical evidence, often simply citing to anecdotal stories
to justify their contentions. In response to these spurious claims, lawmakers in Illinois recently enacted legislation limiting non-economic damages
to $500,000 against a physician and $1,000,000 against a hospital in
medical malpractice cases.5
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that non-economic damage awards are not fueling the rapid rise in malpractice insurance rates, and
damage limitations do not reduce malpractice insurance premiums. It will
examine the major claims made by the insurance and medical lobbies to
manipulate public and legislative support for caps on non-economic
damages and show that each is misleading, not supported by empirical data,
or simply false. Reprehensibly, cap legislation burdens those in need of the
most protection, seriously injured medical malpractice victims, who are
victimized again, this time in favor of insurance industry profiteering.

professor at Northern Illinois University College of Law, where he teaches trial advocacy
courses.
**
Lisa R. Fabiano graduated from Loyola University School of Law and clerked
for the Honorable Stanley J. Roszkowski of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. She is now in private practice in Rockford, Illinois, concentrating in
personal injury and appellate law, representing both plaintiffs and defendants.
1. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076 (Ill. 1997).
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Nos. 30.06, 30.07, 30.08 & 30.09 (2005
2.
ed.).
3.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Nos. 30.04, 30.04.01 & 30.05 (2005
ed.).
4.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Nos. 31.01 & 31.11 (2005 ed.).
5.
2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3440 (West).
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IE. BACKGROUND

This most recent effort to limit medical malpractice victims' right to
recover damages is not new to Illinois. It has been attempted twice before,
and each time, the Illinois Supreme Court has held such legislation to be
unconstitutional. The first attempt came in 1975, when the General
Assembly passed "an Act to revise the law in relation to medical malpractice." 6 The Act limited the maximum amount of all damages recoverable
by a plaintiff "on account of injuries by reason of medical, hospital or other
healing art malpractice" to $500,000. 7 But in Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital Ass'n, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the limitation on
medical malpractice recovery constituted special legislation in violation of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution.' The court held that whenever recovery is
permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in
violation of the special legislation clause, and that limiting recovery to
$500,000 only in medical malpractice actions is arbitrary. 9
Two decades later, in 1995, the General Assembly once again tried to
restrict victims' rights, passing the Civil Justice Reform Amendments.' 0
The most contentious provision was a $500,000 limitation on non-economic
damages in bodily injury cases, death cases and physical damage to
property cases based on negligence or product liability." In Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, the court again considered the constitutionality of a
damage limitation and again held that the cap violated the special legislation clause. 12 The court stated that "the purpose of the special legislation
clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in
favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.' 3 A law is
violative of the special legislation clause when it contains an arbitrary
classification of similarly situated individuals
14 without adequate justification
or connection to a legitimate state interest.
The court held that the statutory cap on compensatory damages for
non-economic losses was arbitrary because the statute limited damages only
in certain tort cases and undermined the goal of the tort system to make
1975 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2888 (West).
6.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975).
7.
8.
347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976). The special legislation clause states: "The General
Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.
Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
9.
Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 Ill. Laws 284, 299 (repealed 1997).
10.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1(a) (1995).
11.
689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
12.
Id. at 1069-70.
13.
Id. at 1072.
14.
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victims whole.1 5 Rejecting the defendants' contention that the legitimate
state interest.was a system wide tort liability cost savings, the court held
that even if there were such unspecified savings, the special legislation
6
clause prohibits such savings on the backs of one class of tort victims.'
The court further found that the legislation was violative of the separation of powers clause, which prohibits any of the three branches of
'7
government from "exercis[ing] powers properly belonging to another.'
The court stated that the authority and obligation to reduce excessive jury8
verdicts rests with the judiciary through the doctrine of remittitur.1
Remittitur is a uniquely judicial function that is essential to the administration of justice and should be considered only on a case by case basis.' 9
However, the court found that the statutory cap was a "legislative remittitur," which operated without regard to the proven specific non-economic
damages of injured plaintiffs. 20 As such, this legislative remittitur unduly
encroached on the court's fundamental "judicial prerogative of determining
whether a jury's assessment of damages is excessive within the meaning of
the law," and hence, violated the separation of powers clause.2'
Despite these clear precedents, on August 25, 2005, Governor Rod
Blagojevich capitulated to public pressure manipulated by the powerful
insurance and medical industries. He signed into law Public Act 94-677,
which, among other things, limits non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases to $500,000 against physicians and $1,000,000 against
hospitals, even though the data clearly shows that non-economic damage
awards are not fueling the increase in physicians' premiums. 22
The medical malpractice insurance industry, through medical trade
associations, has waged a public relations campaign to convince the public
that there is a medical malpractice crisis, i.e., that too many people are
suing doctors and getting too much money for their pain and suffering.
They allege that large payouts are causing premiums to rise, forcing doctors
to either leave the state in search of more affordable rates, limit their
practices or retire. This resonates with the public, who are fearful of a loss
of available medical care. But, on the contrary, both the public and
physicians are being duped. The losers are seriously injured medical
malpractice victims, who are deprived of a jury's determination of the full
measure of their damages, and physicians, whose rates continue to rise
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
ILL. CONST.art. H1§ 1.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079.
Id.
Id. at 1080.
Id.
Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 I11.
Legis. Serv. (West).
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despite cap legislation. Meanwhile, insurance companies reap increased
profits through windfall legislation that reduces their exposure, while the
pain and disability of malpractice victims persists uncapped. The next
section discusses the major insurance and medical industries' claims in
support of caps on non-economic damages and demonstrates that they are
baseless.
III.

ONLY A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF THE MANY VICTIMS OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SEEK COMPENSATION FOR THEIR INJURIES

The insurance and medical lobbies have created a caricature of the
sue-happy, greedy and undeserving patient who enters the medical
malpractice lottery hoping to win the jackpot. Tom Baker, author of The
Medical Malpractice Myth, describes public perception this way: "According to the myth, people sue at the drop of a hat with no good reason, juries
regularly hand out huge sums to almost anyone who asks, and, as a result,
doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies have to pay large ransoms to
escape from the clutches of the tort system even when the doctors did
nothing wrong. 2 3 However, 24research decisively debunks this myth of the
medical malpractice plaintiff.
In reality, victims of medical malpractice rarely sue healthcare providers. Far more patients are injured each year by medical negligence than
those who actually pursue a claim. One study estimated that as many as
98,000 people die in hospitals each year from preventable medical errors in
the United States.
Here in Illinois, there are as many as 4,325 patient
deaths per year.26 Not included in these figures are the many people who
suffer serious but non-fatal preventable medical injuries. Yet, only an
estimated 4% of malpractice victims pursue a claim. 27 Thus, up to 96% of
medical malpractice victims never seek compensation for their often
debilitating injuries. Furthermore, this number has decreased in Illinois
over the past decade.
Dr. Neil Vidmar, a recognized researcher and author on medical malpractice litigation, was recently commissioned by the Illinois State Bar
Association to determine whether medical malpractice litigation in Illinois

23.

24.
25.
(1999)).
26.

TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68 (2005).

Id.
Id. (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE U.S. NAT. ACAD. OF ScI., To ERR Is HUMAN

PUBLIC CrIZEN's CONGRESS WATCH, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS: CHALLENGING
THE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OF THE DOCTOR'S LOBBY, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH

13 (2003).
27.
BAKER, supra note 23, at 69.
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is the cause of medical liability insurance premium increases. 28 As part of
this study, Dr. Vidmar examined all of the medical malpractice case filings
between 1994 and 2004 in the two most populous counties in Illinois, Cook
and DuPage. 29 Together, these counties comprise 49% of the population of
the state and two-thirds of patient care physicians. 3 0 The data he compiled
demonstrates a downward trend in medical malpractice case filings during
that ten year period. 3'
In Cook County, there were 1,831 filings in 1994, but only 1,226 in
2004.32 From 1996 until 2004, filings remained relatively stable within a
range of 1,214 to 1,443. 33 Similarly, in DuPage County, there were 113
filings in 1994, but only 57 in 2004.34 From 1996 until 2004, filings
remained within a range of 57 to 80. Ironically, just a year before
dramatically raising its premiums, ISMIE Mutual Insurance Company,
Illinois' largest medical malpractice insurer, acknowledged this downward
trend, reporting that "[d]ue to the favorable trends in claims reported since
mid-1995, we have recently modified our reinsurance strategy to increase
our retention and decrease premiums and risk ceded to reinsurers. ' 36
Not only has there been a reduction in the number of medical malpractice suits filed over the past ten years, but the number of indemnity
payments made annually by ISMIE statewide has decreased in recent years.
ISMIE paid 400 claims in 1998, compared with 281 claims in 2004, with a
nominal increase in 2004 over 2003. 37 Intuitively, it would seem that the
number of suits filed and claims paid should rise steadily from year to year
because of the increases in population and the number of doctors practicing
in the state, and the prevalence of medical errors.38 Instead, the data shows

28.

NEIL VI)MAR, ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE TORT

SYSTEM INILLINOIS, 2 (2005).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Mike Fitzgerald, Doctor Insurers' Rates and Perks Up, BELLEVILLE NEwsDEMOCRAT, Jan. 1, 2006; ISMIE Holdings Inc. Registration Statement Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Amendment No. 3 to Form S-4, Feb. 14, 2000.
37.
Keith A. Hebeisen, Caps on Damages Reward Insurers at the Expense of Those
Injured or Killed by Medical Malpractice, TRIAL J.,Illinois Trial Lawyer's Ass'n, Winter
2006, at 10 (citing ISMIE data set forth in its annual statements submitted to the Illinois
Division of Insurance).
38.
From 1993 to 2003, the population of Illinois increased from approximately
21,100,000 to approximately 23,900,000. From 1993 to 2003, the number of total patient
care doctors in Illinois rose form 24,514 to 30,264. VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 75-76.
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an opposite trend in both case filings and claims paid since 1998. So, the
myth of the sue-happy patient does not hold up to scrutiny.
IV. TOTAL ANNUAL INDEMNITY PAYMENTS HAVE DECLINED IN RECENT
YEARS IN ILLINOIS

Medical malpractice insurers blame the dramatic increase in premiums
in recent years on an allegedly enormous increase in payouts. For instance,
the American Medical Association (AMA) claims that physicians insured
by ISMIE experienced a premium rate increase of 35.2% in July 2003
because of a whopping 59% increase in payouts. 39 Not surprisingly, while
citing such statistics, these special interest groups never mention the total
annual indemnity payments made over the last several years. Why?
Because the data exposes the falseness of their claim.
The figures from ISMIE's own financial records show that while it
raised premiums dramatically beginning in 2003, its paid losses between
2000 and 2005 remained very stable. 4° In 2000, ISMIE paid claims totaling
$163,800,000, while taking in premiums of $164,800,000. 4' In 2001, it
paid claims of $141,300,000, while taking in premiums of $209,000,000.42
In 2002, its payouts totaled $158,100,000, while premiums totaled
$265,600,000. 43 In 2003, its payouts totaled $165,200,000, while premiums
totaled $364,300,000. In 2004, ISMIE's paid losses totaled $153,400,000,
while its premiums totaled an astonishing $425,300,000. 44 Finally, in 2005,
ISMIE's paid losses totaled $142,600,000, while its premiums totaled
$401,100,000.4 1 Statewide, medical malpractice insurers had an even better
ratio between premiums and payouts than ISMIE. For instance, in 2000,
Illinois medical malpractice insurers paid claims totaling $332,924,227,

39.
American Medical Association, America's Medical Liability Crisis Backgrounder, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/12386.htm
(last visited Feb. 5,
2006).
40.
JAY ANGOFF, FALLING CLAIMS AND RISING PREMIUMS IN THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2, 4, 7 (2005) (citing data derived from ISMIE's five
year historical data contained in its 2004 annual statement filed with the Illinois Division of
Insurance); ISMIE Mutual Ins. Co., Annual Statement for 2005, filed with the Illinois
Division of Insurance, Exhibit of Premiums and Losses (statutory page 14).
41.
Id. at 7.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 2, 7 (ISMIE's premiums and payouts cited are all gross figures, i.e., before
accounting for reinsurance).
45. ISMIE Mutual Ins. Co., Annual Statement for 2005, filed with the Illinois
Division of Insurance, Exhibit of Premiums and Losses (statutory page 14).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 26

while taking in premiums of $393,725,344.46 In 2001, they paid claims
totaling $323,015,606, while taking in premiums of $432,425,486. 47
These figures illustrate the lack of any correlation between premiums
received and claims paid by ISMIE over the last several years. Payouts
have remained essentially flat with only minor fluctuations, while premiums have skyrocketed. Comparing 2000 with 2004, losses paid actually
decreased by 6.3%, while premiums increased by 158.1%.49 Clearly, these
figures belie the contention that ISMIE's 35.2% rate increase in 2003 was
due to an increase in payouts. Indeed, at the hearing before the Director of
Insurance seeking approval for its 2005 rate increase, an ISMIE official
admitted that the 35.2% increase in 2003 was not triggered by payouts
made in the preceding years.50
Nationally, the picture is the same. Jay Angoff, the former Missouri
Insurance Director, studied the 15 largest medical malpractice insurers in
the nation, of which ISMIE is one, and analyzed their performance from the
years 2000 to 2004.51 He ascertained that during that five year period, these
insurers doubled their premiums collected, while their claims payouts
remained essentially stable. 2 In fact, in 2004, these major insurers took in
approximately three times more in premiums than they paid out in claims. 3
As a result, they have far more surplus, i.e., money over and above the
funds set aside to pay estimated future claims, than is required by the

46.
AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES IN ILINOIS 7 (2003), available at http://www.insurancereform.org/StableLossesL.pdf (The data is current only through 2001) [hereinafter AM. FOR
INS. REFORM].

47.
Id.
48.
ANGOFF, supra note 40, at 7 (citing data derived from 2004 annual statement
filed with Illinois Division of Insurance).
49.
Id.
50. I11.Dept. of Fin and Prof'l Regulation, In the Matter of the Medical Malpractice
Rate Increase of: ISMIE Mutual Insurance, Hearing No. 05-HR-0771 (2005), at 94-98 (Sept.
27, 2005) & In the Matter of the Medical Malpractice Rate Increase of: ISMIE Indemnity
Company, Hearing No. 05-HR-0772 (2005), availableat
http://www.idfpr.com/DOI/pressRelease/prO5/092705MM.pdf [hereinafter Rate Hearings].
Under certain circumstances, Public Act 94-677 requires the Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation, Division of Insurance, to conduct public hearings to determine
whether medical liability insurance rates are excessive, inadequate or discriminatory
pursuant certain statutory criteria. If the insurer's rate increase is greater than 6%, the
Division of Insurance must hold a hearing. The public hearing regarding ISMIE's 2005 rate
increase was held on September 27, and November 9, 2005. Id. at 2-5.
51.
ANGOFF, supra note 40, at 1.
52.
Id.at 1.
53.
Id. at 8.
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 54 ISMIE, for example,
now has almost double the amount of surplus required."
V.

WHILE JURY AWARDS MAY HAVE INCREASED, ISMIE'S INDEMNITY
PAYMENTS HAVE NOT

Instead of highlighting how much they pay out in indemnity claims,
insurers cry that large jury awards are increasing in frequency and
amount.56 For instance, the Illinois State Medical Society claimed that the
average jury verdict in Cook County increased by roughly 300% from 1998
to 2003. 57 However, such statistics are misleading.58
First, it is important to note that jury verdicts account for a very small
percentage of indemnity payments. Only about 10% of medical malpractice lawsuits ever go to jury verdict. 59 Moreover, there is a misperception
perpetuated by the AMA that juries favor patients in medical malpractice
cases. 60 On the contrary, juries are biased in favor of doctors. Nationally,
plaintiffs lose 70% of the time in medical malpractice jury trials, and in
Illinois, the loss rate is similar.6' Interestingly, judges find for plaintiffs
more often than juries.62 However, the amount insurers actually pay on
those verdicts is never revealed to the public by the Illinois State Medical
Society.
Curiously, while they contend that verdicts have increased substantially, ISMIE's claims data shows that indemnity payments have remained
essentially flat.63 Considering that settlements are allegedly driven by
verdicts, if the average verdict increased by roughly 300% from 1998 to
2003, ISMIE's indemnity payouts should also have increased by 300%. On

54.
55.
56.

Id. at 4, 19.
Id. at 19.
Carolyn Victoria J. Lees, The Inevitable Reevaluation of Best v. Taylor in Light

of Illinois' Health Care Crises, 25 N. ILL. U. LAW REv. 217, 218 (2005).
Ili. St. Med. Soc'y, The Medical Litigation Crisis, 3 available at
57.

http://www.isms.org/realmedicine/ info/MedicalLitigationCrisis.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2006) [hereinafter I1l. St. Med. Soc'y].
The Illinois State Medical Society and ISMIE have an incestuous relationship.
58.
Through a shared services agreement, they share high level employees, support staff, offices
and costs, and have a common employer, Illinois State Medical Insurance Services, Inc.
(ISMIS). Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 84-85 (Nov. 9, 2005), 98-102 (Nov. 9, 2005),
221-30 (Sept. 27, 2005).
59.
60.

VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 48.
BAKER, supra note 23, at 74.

62.

BAKER, supra note 23, at 73.

61.

Id.; VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 26-27.

63.
ANGoFF, supra note 40, at 7 (Data contained in Table 2, citing data derived
from 2004 annual statement filed with Illinois Division of Insurance).
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the contrary, ISMIE's annual payouts have not increased at all. 64 In fact,
2004 payments decreased 6.3% from 2000.65 The conclusion must be that
these large verdicts are having little impact on annual indemnity payouts.
What are the reasons for this counter-intuitive result? First, since only
10% of malpractice cases are decided by jury verdict and plaintiffs win only
30% of the time, verdicts account for a small percentage of claims paid.
Furthermore, rather than large verdicts inflating settlement value, defense
verdicts actually deflate settlement value. Plaintiffs, knowing that juries are
biased in favor of doctors, discount settlements accordingly. For example,
a plaintiff may sustain serious permanent injuries and believe that a jury
should award $1,000,000 if malpractice is proven. However, the plaintiff
knows that statistically a jury will find in favor of the doctor seven out of
ten times. In determining settlement value, the plaintiff factors in this high
loss ratio and arrives at an amount which is substantially less than
$1,000,000.
Furthermore, Dr. Vidmar determined that for several reasons the verdict awarded is frequently not the amount actually paid. 66 Often the parties
enter into high-low settlement agreements before the jury returns a
verdict.6 7 Many cases settle for the policy limits of coverage after the
verdict, usually $1,000,000 or $2,000,000.68 Occasionally, the trial judge
reduces or overturns the verdict at the post-trial motion stage 69 or there are
setoffs from non-physician defendants who settle before or during trial.7 °
Sometimes the appellate court reverses the jury's verdict.7' In any event, the
insurer's exposure is ultimately capped by the policy limits of coverage.72
Illinois State Medical Society is misleading its constituency and the public
when it doesn't tell the full story about the relationship between jury
verdicts and annual indemnity payouts- verdicts are not the driving force
behind increasing premiums.

64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 28-30, 47-49.
67.
Id.
68.
Most of the policies that ISMIE writes have limits of $1,000,000 or $2,000,000.
Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 123 (Sept. 27, 2005); VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 28-29, 4749.
69.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 28-29, 47-49.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Although most of ISMIE's policies have limits of $1,000,000 or $ 2,000,000,
under the arrangement it has with its reinsurers, ISMIE's actual exposure is generally capped
at $500,000 per lawsuit, with the reinsurer indemnifying ISMIE for any amount over that up
to the policy limits. Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 63-69 (Sept. 27, 2005).
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VI. MADISON AND ST. CLAIR COUNTIES ARE NOT
"JUDICIAL HELLHOLES"

Cap proponents who claim that jury verdicts are increasing in size and
frequency focus particularly on Madison and St. Clair counties in southern
Illinois. The American Tort Reform Association has labeled them "judicial
hellholes," contending that juries in those counties hand out frequent and
excessive verdicts to plaintiffs in civil litigation cases and that personal
injury lawyers seek out these counties "because they know they will
produce a positive outcome .... Again, the data does not support these
claims.
Due to the controversy, Dr. Vidmar did a detailed study of medical
From 1992 to 2005, there were
malpractice jury trials in these counties.
twenty-six such trials in Madison County, of which plaintiffs lost sevenOf the verdicts for plaintiffs, only one award exceeded
teen.75
$1,000,000.76 In St. Clair County, there were fourteen medical malpractice
jury trials from 1993 to 2003, of which plaintiffs lost twelve.7 7 Of the two
verdicts for plaintiff, only one was in excess of $1,000,000, but that case
was reversed on appeal.7 8 In the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois, there were eight medical malpractice jury trials
between 1992 and 2003, of which plaintiffs lost six. 79 The two plaintiff
verdicts were for $375,000 and $100,000.80 Thus, of these forty-eight jury
trials, plaintiffs lost 73% of the time, and there was only one verdict upheld
over one million dollars. Rather than being "judicial hellholes," these
counties are actually physician-friendly in medical malpractice cases.
VII. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE INDUSTRY MISREPRESENTS
ITS LOSSES THROUGH MISLEADING ACCOUNTING PRACTICES

In order to convince the public and lawmakers that caps are necessary,
medical malpractice insurers allege that they pay more in indemnity claims
than they receive in premiums. For instance, in 2001, a coalition of Florida
insurance companies, hospitals and medical lobbyists claimed that medical
liability insurers nationally paid out $1.40 in losses for every $1.00 in
JUDICIAL
ASSOCIATION,
TORT REFORM
73.
AMERICAN
http://www.atra.org/reports/ hellholes/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 51-64.
74.
75.
Id. at 52.
Id.
76.
77.
Id. at 58.
Id.
78.
79.
Id. at 62.
80.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 62.

HELLHOLES

2005,
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premiums collected. 8' ISMIE claimed to have "paid out $1.19 for every
$1.00 in premium income in 2002." 82 These disingenuous claims are based
upon misleading accounting practices.8 3
In setting premiums for a particular year, an insurance company first
estimates the amount it will eventually pay out for claims covered by
policies in that year. 84 However, there is approximately a ten year lag
between when premiums are received and when all of the claims arising in
that policy year are paid.
In other words, when setting a premium, an
insurance company does not know what its losses will be for that particular
rate setting year. Consequently, the insurance company must project what
those losses will be. Misleadingly, this estimate is called an "incurred
loss," rather than, more appropriately, a "projected loss. ' ' 86 On the other
hand, a company's "paid losses" are the amount that they eventually pay
out over that ten year period for all claims arising in that particular year.87
For example, in setting premiums for calendar year 2006, an insurance
company may project losses of $400,000,000 for all claims arising in
calendar year 2006. However, when all of the claims which arose in
calendar year 2006 are paid by the year 2016, the total actual loss on those
claims may be only $216,000,000.
Unfortunately, there are no standards, other than in the state of California, to regulate how an insurance company must calculate its projected
losses. 88 As a result, medical liability insurers routinely inflate their
projected losses for a given year to justify sharp increases in premiums and
the need for damage caps.89 These projected losses ultimately have little
relationship to what is eventually paid out in actual losses. One study
examined the industry's reported projected losses and the actual losses over

81.
THE FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, FALSE ACCOUNTING:
How THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE COMPANIES INFLATE LOSSES TO JUSTIFY
SUDDEN SURGES IN RATES AND TORT REFORM, 8 (Dec. 29, 2005)

http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/maplractice/rp/5714.pdf [hereinafter FALSE
ACCOUNTING].

82.
ISMIE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 2002 ISMIE ANNUAL REPORT, 2,
available at http://www.ismie.com/about/2002AR.pdf (last visited March 3, 2006)
[hereinafter ISMIE REPORT].
83.
Id. at 8.
84.
FALSE ACCOUNTING, supra note 81, at 6-7.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 7. For clarity, incurred losses will hereafter be referred to as projected
losses.
87.
Id.at 6-8.
88.
Id. at 6.
89.
Id. at 10-13.
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a nine year period and found that malpractice insurers overstated projected
losses by 46%.90
Thus, when ISMIE claims to have "paid out $1.19 for every $1.00 in
premium income in 2002," it sounds as if it had a bad year.9' However, that
statement must be based upon its overestimated and not yet paid projected
losses, because in 2002, ISMIE paid out claims totaling $158,100,000 and
had premium income of $265,600,000, hardly a loss for that year.9 2
Unwittingly, the news media reports that medical malpractice insurers are
losing money at an alarming rate, and insurers let this misperception stir up
public and legislative support for caps.93
Historically, medical liability insurers in Illinois had virtually unlimited discretion in calculating projected losses. 94 In his statement to the
Illinois Division of Insurance regarding ISMIE's rate increase, Missouri's
former Insurance Director Jay Angoff urged the adoption of standards that
actuaries must follow in calculating projected losses and other assumptions
95
to justify rate increases, as is the case in California's regulatory system.
Such standards "would substantially reduce the arbitrariness that exists in
the current ratemaking process. 96
In addition to making projected losses bear some relationship to actual
losses, increased regulation would prohibit ISMIE from factoring into its
ratemaking such expenses as the $4,900,000 "deferred compensation"
payment made to outgoing Chief Operating Officer Donald Udstuen shortly
before he pleaded guilty to taking kickbacks on state contracts. 97 Regulation would also prohibit factoring into rate increases the million dollar
salary and low interest mortgage loan of nearly a million dollars given to its
current chief executive officer. 98 Furthermore, it would likely prohibit
90.
FALSE ACCOUNTING, supra note 81, at 13.
From 1986 to 1995, ISMIE
overestimated its projected losses by 15.2% or $189,500,000. Statement of Jay Angoff to the
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Division of Insurance, In The Matter
Of The Medical Malpractice Rate Increase of ISMIE Mutual Insurance Company,
September 27, 2005, Exhibit B.
91.
ISMIE REPORT, supra note 82, at 2.
92.
ANGorI, supra note 40, at 7 (citing data derived from 2004 annual statement
filed with Illinois Division of Insurance).
93.
FALSE ACCOUNTING, supra note 81, at 8.
94.

Statement of Jay Angoff, supra note 90, at 7-8.

95.
Id.
96.
Id. Mr. Angoff analyzed ISMIE's annual statements for the years 2002, 2003
and 2004 and found that its 45.2% rate increase during those years was unjustified by either
its paid losses or its projected losses. Id. at 8-9.
97.
Tim Novak & Steve Warmbir, Witness in Probe of Ryan Era Got 4.9 Mil.
Goodbye, Cw. SuN-TiMEs, May 27, 2003, at 8. This payment was made to Udstuen in 2002,
the year before ISMIE raised premiums by 35%. Id. Hebeisen, supra note 37, at 32.
Fitzgerald, supra, note 36, at IA. These perks were given at about the time that
98.
ISMIE was raising rates on its insureds significantly.
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ISMIE from gouging a 6.5% broker fee from physicians who don't use a
broker, its current practice with 38% of policyholders. 99
VIII.

PHYSICIANS ARE NOT FLEEING ILLINOIS

In an attempt to panic the public into demanding caps, the medical
lobby has issued dire warnings that physicians are "fleeing Illinois in search
of more affordable coverage and leaving Illinois patients bereft of health
'' °
care options, as the number and availability of physicians declines."
Illinois State Medical Society and ISMIE have suggested that physicians
are leaving in such great numbers that "it is as if the Illinois Department of
Transportation erected signs at our state's borders saying: '[d]octors not
wanted - enter at your own risk." ' 1° However, the data does not support
these ominous and absurd allegations.
As part of his study, Dr. Vidmar sought to determine whether the
number of doctors in Illinois is declining, as claimed by the AMA. 102 Using
the AMA's data, current through 2003,103 Dr. Vidmar examined all active
non-federal patient care physicians, and in particular, obstetrician/gynecologists and neurosurgeons, the two subspecialties whose
numbers purportedly have been most affected by the liability insurance
increase. 104
The trend Dr. Vidmar found contradicts the AMA's assertion that the
number of physicians in Illinois is plummeting. Instead, the AMA's own
data shows that the number of physicians in Illinois steadily increased
between 1993 and 2003, from 24,514 to 30,264, a net gain of 5,750.105
Equally important, the number of physicians per capita also steadily
increased from 211 to 239 per 100,000 Illinoisans. 1°6 Likewise, during that
same time period, the number of obstetrician/gynecologists steadily
99.
Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 186-205 (Nov. 9, 2005). For ISMIE's
interesting explanation of why it charges a 6.5% broker fee on the 38% of policyholders who
do not use a broker, see id.
100.
Lees, supra note 56, at 218 (citing American Medical Association, Medical
Liability Reform - NOW!, at 4 (Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.amaassn.org/go/mlrnow).
101.
Ill. St. Med. Soc'y, supra note 57, at 2.
102.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 73.
103.
Dr. Vidmar relied on American Medical Association, Physician Characteristics
and Distribution in the U.S., 2005 Edition.
104.
VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 73-77. Dr. Vidmar studied all physicians except
those employed by the federal government and its agencies, because their tort liability is
assumed by the federal government, and thus, they are not affected by liability insurance
premiums. In addition, he looked only at physicians in Illinois with an active license who are
focused on patient care. Id. at 73-75.
105.
Id. at 75.
106.
Id. at 76.

2006]

THE FLEECING OF SERIOUSLY INJURED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ViCTIMS IN ILLINOIS

541

increased from 1,596 to 1,814, and the number of neurosurgeons increased
from 191 to 212.17 Dr. Vidmar also examined the number of physicians in
Madison and St. Clair counties because of claims of mass exodus from
these "judicial hellholes."' 0 8 Contrary to the hype, the data shows that the
number of physicians in those counties remained steady from 1993 to
2003.19 Accordingly, the AMA's own data contradicts its claims." 0
Although the AMA's data was current only through 2003, Crain's
Chicago Business, a well-respected publication, recently reported that the
number of licensed doctors in Illinois rose by 9% in the last three years,
despite assertions by the medical lobby that physicians are fleeing to
neighboring states with lower malpractice premiums."' Further, obstetrician/gynecologists and neurosurgeons in Illinois increased by 2% and 3%,
respectively, in the past year. 1 2 Even more telling, in Indiana, a cap state
for many years, the number of licensed physicians declined by 18%
between 2002 and 2005.113 Crain's concluded that "licensing data for
Illinois and surrounding states doesn't reveal any correlation between the
physician population and liability caps.""' 1 4 A spokesperson for the Illinois
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation reported' 5to Crain's
that: "We're not seeing an unstable market for docs in Illinois." "
Likewise, nationally, the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) determined that there is no widespread healthcare access crisis
caused by rising medical malpractice premiums. 1 6 In its report to
congressional requesters, the GAO found that the AMA's claims were
inaccurate, unsubstantiated, exaggerated, or to the extent that there were a
few access problems, attributable to other explanations. 1 7 Rather than
accept the GAO's findings, the AMA tried to quash the report." 8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, relying on this non-partisan GAO study and other current
research, determined that caps on non-economic damages do not attract or

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
2005, at 1.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.at 75.

VIDMAR, supra note 28, at 51-64.

Id. at 77-82.
Id. at82.
Bret Chase, Caps or No, Ill. Adds to Doc Totals, CRAIN's CHLI. Bus., Sept. 11,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 7 (Aug. 2003).
117.
Id.at 5,13, 16-18.
116.
118.

Id. at 38.
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keep doctors in a state. 1 9 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
absence of caps do not influence doctors to leave a state. 20 Contrary to the
widespread hype from medical trade associations that doctors are fleeing
non-cap states, caps do not affect physicians' migration. Rather than
fleeing Illinois, physicians are instead choosing to practice medicine in
Illinois.
IX. INSURANCE INDUSTRY MISMANAGEMENT AND DECLINE IN

INVESTMENTS, NOT DAMAGE PAYOUTS, CAUSE INCREASES IN
MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS

The insurance and medical lobbies adamantly claim that caps on non-

economic damages reduce premiums. 121

However, experience shows

otherwise. Weiss Ratings Inc., an esteemed insurance industry analyst,

studied the affect of caps on physicians' premiums. 122 The authors of the
study concluded that physicians' premiums were rapidly increasing despite
caps. 23 In fact, it found that between 1991 and 2002, physicians in the
nineteen states with caps experienced a significantly larger increase in
premiums than their colleagues in non-cap states. 24 In cap states, doctors
suffered a 48.2% increase in premiums, 125 while innon-cap states, doctors'
premiums rose by only 35.9%.126 Furthermore, only 10.5% of cap states
experienced steady or decreasing premiums, while 18.7% of non-cap states
experienced steady or decreasing premiums. 127 The authors, who did not
expect this result, concluded that "[t]here are other, far more important
factors driving the rise in med mal premiums than caps or med mal
payouts."' 128 Weiss determined that by pushing for caps, insurance
companies and their allies are distracting the public from the industry's
mismanagement
and "using the insurance crisis opportunistically to push
29
tort reform." 1

119.
701 N.W.2d 440, 485-87 (Wis. 2005). In Ferdon, the court held that the
$350,000 limitation on non-economic damages (indexed to inflation to $410,322) violates
the Wisconsin Constitution. Id. at 491.
120.
Id. at 485.
121.
Ill.
St. Med. Soc'y, supra note 57, at 3-5.
122.
MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS (Weiss Ratings Inc.
2003).
123.
Id.at 3.
124.
Id.at 7-8.
125.
Id.at 7.
126.
Id.at 7-8.
127.
Id.at 8.
128.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 8.
129. Id.at 14.
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Shamefully, while they push for such legislation, the insurance industry knows that caps do not reduce premiums. In its filing to the Texas
Department of Insurance seeking a rate increase despite the recent
enactment of a cap on non-economic damages, GE Medical Protective
Company, one of the nation's largest insurers, stated that a rate increase
was necessary because "[n]on-economic damages are a small percentage of
total losses paid. Capping non-economic damages will show a loss savings
of 1.0%."13o Similarly, when South Carolina's largest medical malpractice
insurer, Marsh USA, was asked by the government what impact a $250,000
non-economic damage cap would have on premiums, a high ranking
executive would not guarantee that caps would lower premiums.1 31 In
2003, an assistant vice president of SPCIE, a major California medical
malpractice insurer, testified that California's $250,000 cap on32 noneconomic damages does not substantially reduce the risk to insurers.'
Here in Illinois, after the General Assembly passed the $500,000 cap
on non-economic damages in May 2005, ISMIE raised malpractice rates on
its corporate and partnership policies by over 20% in June. 33 At the
hearing on these rate increases, ISMIE executives refused to say when or if
rates would come down as a result of the damage cap.' 34 This refusal
occurred despite the fact that ISMIE touted to physicians, lawmakers and
the public that capping non-economic damages "is the single most
35
important reform that could be enacted" to lower insurance premiums.

Medical malpractice insurers know what the Weiss study concluded: that
"[t]he imposition of caps will not make a significant dent in the problem...
It is no substitute for longer-term, fundamental
solutions that address the
136
actual factors behind the med mal crisis."'
Weiss Ratings identifies six factors that are fueling the rise in insurance rates, including medical cost inflation, the decrease in the number of
medical malpractice insurers, the cyclical nature of the insurance market,
130.

Letter from Melissa Coker, Regulatory Specialist, GE Medical Protective

Company to Hon. Jose 0. Montemayor, Insurance Commissioner, Texas Department of
Insurance (Aug. 30, 2003) and attached Memorandum from the Texas Medical Protective
Company - Texas Physicians and Surgeons Actuarial Tort Reform Memorandum, at
http://www. consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/2059.pdf (last visited on Mar. 23, 2006).
131.
Letter from Timothy J. Ward, Assistant Vice President Marsh USA to Michael
N. Couick, Senate Judiciary Committee (February 7, 2005) at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/181O.pdf (last visted on Mar. 23, 2006).
132.
Written testimony of James Robertson, Assistant Vice President, SCPIE, in
response to orders by the Court, 4 (Apr. 30, 2003) at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/2058.pdf (last visited on Mar. 23, 2006).
133.
Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 83 (Sept. 27, 2005).
134.
Id. at 144-49 (Nov. 9, 2005).
135.
Ill. St. Med. Soc'y, supra note 57, at 9, 13.
136.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 15.
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and the decline in investment income. 137 During the period 1991 to 2002,
the medical rate of inflation was 75%, which directly impacts the economic
portion of settlements and Verdicts.1 38 There have also been a shrinking
number of medical malpractice carriers since 1997, thereby reducing supply
and putting upward pressure on premiums. 139
The most significant factors, however, are the cyclical nature of the
casualty insurance market and the decline in investment income. 14 0 The
insurance industry is subject to a recognized and predictable economic
cycle. 141 Insurers make most of their profit from investments, which
fluctuate with the stock market and interest rates.1 42 Premium dollars are
invested from the time they are collected until claims incurred in that policy
143
year are paid. This practice is otherwise known as investing the "float.'
In the medical liability insurance industry, this is usually a five to ten year
period.144 When the investment market is good, insurance companies slash
premiums to attract policyholders and insure risky doctors in an effort to
raise investment capital. 145 The insurers are willing to severely under-price
policies and take on poor risks at the expense of underwriting losses
because they are reaping huge profits investing the float.'46
But what goes up must come down. When their stock investments turn
south, coupled with declining interest rates on their bond holdings, they
begin to feel the effects of their mismanagement. 47 As a result, they raise
the standards for insurability and increase premiums drastically, ushering in
a "medical malpractice crisis" period, as happened in the mid-70s, mid-80s
and at the beginning of this decade.148 If instead verdicts were responsible
for these periodic sharp increases in premiums, juries must have awarded
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 9-12.
Id.
Id.at 11-12.

ILL. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND DOCTOR

DISCIPLINE ISSUES 7-8 (Feb. 2005) at
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%2OMalpractice/ITLAmed
-maLposition-paper-)5.pdf

[hereinafter ITLA, INSURANCE ISSUES]; ILL. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N, REPORT TO THE ILLtNOIS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 5-6 (2003) [hereinafter
ITLA, REPORT TO ILL. GEN. Ass.].

141.
142.
143.

ITLA, INSURANCE ISSUES, supra note 140, at 7.
AM. FOR INS. REFORM, supra note 46, at 7.

JOANNE DOROSHOW & J. ROBERT HUNTER, INSURANCE "CRISIS"

OFFICIALLY

3 (Americans for
Insurance Reform, Feb. 2006), at http://insurance-reform.org/pr/MMSOFTMARKET.pdf
OVER - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES HAVE BEEN STABLE FOR A YEAR

[hereinafter DOROSHOW & HUNTER].

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 9.
Id.; DOROSHOW & HUNTER, supra note 143, at 3.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 9.
Id.; AM. FOR INS. REFORM, supra note 46, at 3.
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giant sums in the mid-70s, taken a sabbatical for ten years, awarded giant
sums in the mid-80s, taken more time off, and then awarded giant sums in
the beginning of this decade. 149 Donald J. Zuk, Chief Executive Officer of
SCPIE Holdings, Inc., recognizing that the crisis is industry created, stated
that "I don't like to hear insurance company executives say it's the tort
system - - it's self-inflicted."' 50
ISMIE's 35% increase in premiums in 2003 came on the heels of the
company's 18% loss of investment income in 2002, due in part to losses
from the sale of stock held in scandal ridden World Coin, Tyco and Quest
Securities.' 51 In addition, the bond market, another big source of ISMIE's
investment income, experienced a reduction in interest rates. 152 At the same
time, reinsurance rates for medical malpractice carriers increased rapidly,
due in part to the events of September 11, 200."53 Thus, while medical
malpractice insurers' payouts in settlements and jury verdicts closely track
medical inflation, premiums do not. 54 Rather, premiums spike and fall in
55
step with the economy and the insurance industry's market investments.
Appallingly, not one seriously injured medical malpractice victim's pain
and suffering played any part in this cycle.
X.

CAPS HAVE NOT REDUCED PREMIUMS IN OTHER STATES

Cap proponents cite California's Medical Injury Compensation Relief
Act (MICRA) as a shining example of the success of cap legislation in
decreasing premiums.156

However, that reliance is sorely misplaced. In

1975, in response to rising medical malpractice rates, California enacted
MICRA which, among other provisions, placed a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. 57 Despite the legislation, medical malpractice
premiums continued to rise dramatically. From 1976 to 1988, premiums
58
rose 190%, with increases higher than the national average.!

149.

150.

DOROSHOW & HUNTER, supra note 143, at 2.

Rachel Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Assigning Liability: Insurer's

Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice 'Crisis' - Lawyers Alone Didn't Cause Premiums to
Skyrocket; EarlierPrice War a Factor- Delivering Ms. Kline's Baby, WALL ST. J., June 24,

2002, at Al.
151.
ITLA, INSURANCE ISSUES, supra note 140, at 7.
152.
Id.
153.
154.
155.

156.
157.
158.

Id.
AM. FOR INS. REFORM, supra note 46, at 1.

Id.
CAL. Ctv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2006); Lees, supra note 56, at 223.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2006).
ITLA, INSURANCE ISSUES, supra note 140, at 4.
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Finally, citizens took matters into their own hands, and in 1988, enacted Proposition 103.159 Proposition 103 rolled back insurance rates up to
20%, froze premiums, refunded millions of dollars in past overcharges to
60
physicians, and required stringent government oversight of rate increases.'
It also allowed consumers to challenge proposed rate increases and made
the insurance commissioner an elected position.' 6' As a result of this voter
initiative, there was an immediate reduction in medical malpractice
insurance rates, and by 1991, premiums had decreased by 20.2%.162
Additionally, insurers refunded about $135,000,000 to healthcare providers
by 1995.163
After the enactment of MICRA, but before the ratification of Proposition 103, premiums in California increased faster than the national average,
rising precipitously in the mid-1980s during that decade's insurance
crisis.'
In fact, rates nearly tripled during that ten year period, despite the
very regressive cap. 65 However, following the passage of Proposition
103's insurance reforms, premiums dropped sharply, continued to decrease,
and then stabilized, contrary to national trends.' 66 Not surprisingly, cap
proponents prefer to highlight MICRA and its $250,000 cap as the reason
for California's successful control of malpractice insurance rates, ignoring
Proposition 103. On the contrary, the facts make plain that it was Proposition 103, with its strict control of the medical
liability insurance industry,
67
which brought about legitimate reform.'
Another instance of legitimate reform comes from our neighbor to the
north. In 1975, the Wisconsin legislature established the Patients Compensation Fund and the Wisconsin Healthcare Liability Insurance Plan
(WHLIP) in response to that decade's "insurance crisis."' 168 The legislation
159.

1861.01).

1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 103 (West) (codified at CAL. INS. CODE Sect.

160.
THE FOUND. FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RTS., How INSURANCE REFORM
LOWERED DOCTORS' MEDICAL MALPRATICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA AND How MALPRATICE

CAPS FAILED 2 (2003),
[hereinafter FOUNDATION].
161.
Id.

162.
163.
164.
165.

http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/1008.pdf

Id.at 3.
Id.
at 4.
ITLA, REPORT TO ILL. GEN. Ass., supra note 140.

FOUNDATION, supra note 160, at 1.
166. Id.at 5.
167.
Id.at 9.
168.
Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, Wis. STAT. § 655.27 (2005).
In 2003, the Fund was renamed Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund. Wis.
CrIZEN ACTION & Wis. ACAD. OF TRIAL LAW., JUSTICE CAPPED, TILTING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE AGAINST INJURED PATIENTS AND THEIR FAMtLES at 8-9 (2005) [hereinafter WATL,
JUSTICE CAPPED];

WiS.
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$1,000,000.169

The Fund is financed through an annual fee on all healthcare providers,
with legislative oversight of the amount of these assessments.1 70 The Fund
acts like an excess insurer, paying any damage settlement or award that
exceeds the primary coverage of $1,000,000.171

WHLIP provides insurance

for any physician who is unable to acquire malpractice insurance on the
open market and operates just like a private insurance company. 72 As of
2004, the Fund had a balance of approximately $741,000,000, with an
estimated surplus exceeding $300,000,000.173 For approximately half of
the Fund's existence,
there have been no caps on non-economic damages in
74
Wisconsin.

Key features of the Fund are (1) its not-for-profit status; (2) it pays
state salaries as opposed to large executive salaries and perks; and (3)
assessments are not heavily contingent on stock and bond market investments. 75 In addition, by having only four assessment classifications, the
Fund more evenly distributes the cost of insuring the risk. The fund
achieves this more even distribution by moderately increasing the cost to
lower risk specialties and thereby reducing the cost to high risk specialties
significantly. 176
In 1995, the Wisconsin legislature imposed a $350,000 non-economic
damage cap indexed to inflation, but in July 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund held that
capping non-economic damages was unconstitutional. 77 In their decision,
the court painstakingly analyzed the performance of the Fund during both
cap and non-cap periods and concluded that "[t]he Fund has flourished both
with and without a cap."'' 7 8 The Fund, which is essentially an insurer with
unlimited exposure (unlike private insurers who always have a policy
limit), has more than sufficient capital to fully compensate medical
malpractice victims and still show a healthy balance sheet. The court in
Ferdon, after considering all of the data, correctly concluded that "[w]e
COMPENSATION FUND

-

A SHORT HISTORY (2005) [hereinafter WATL, INJURED FUND - A

SHORT HISTORY].

169.
Wis. STAT. § 655.23(4)(b)(2) (2005). The primary insurance policy limits
increase from time to time, and have been $1,000,000 since 1997.
170.
WATL, INJURED FUND - A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 168.
171.

WATL, JUSTICE CAPPED, supra note 168, at 8.

172.
Id. at 8-9.
173.
Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 478.
174.
See id. at 477-78.
175.
WATL, JUSTICE CAPPED, supra note 168, at 8-9.
176.
Id. at 9; WATL, INJURED FUND - A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 168.
177.
Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 491; WIs. STAT. § 655.017 (2004); WIS.
893.55.(f)(d) (Supp. 2005); WATL, JUSTICE CAPPED, supra note 168 at 8.
178.
Ferdon. 701 N.W.2d at 483.

STAT. §
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agree with those courts that have determined that the correlation between
caps on noneconomic damages and the reduction of medical malpractice
premiums179 or overall health care costs is at best indirect, weak, and
remote."
Perhaps the best evidence of the fallacy that caps reduce premiums is
the AMA's own list of "crisis states." The crisis states are twenty states
that the AMA charges are "currently experiencing a medical liability
crisis. '" 18 However, of those states, six have caps: West Virginia has had
caps since 1986, Missouri since 1988, Massachusetts since 1997, Florida
since 2002, Nevada since 2002, and Ohio since 2003.18' After caps were
passed in Nevada, one insurer raised rates by 93%. 182 Insurance rates in
Massachusetts increased 88% between 1998 and 2004.183 In Florida, one
insurer sought a rate increase of 45% for 2004.184 After caps were passed in
Ohio in 2003, insurance rates increased by 20% the following year. 185 In
West Virginia, malpractice insurance rates rose as much as 26% between
2001 and 2002.186 In Missouri, where insurance companies have had the
benefit of caps since 1988, premiums rose by 121% from 2000 to 2003.187
And this is reportedly the state that doctors in East St. Louis are swimming

179.
Id. at 485.
180.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM - NOW! 9
(2005), http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/378/mlrnowoct192005.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 27, 2006). The article claims that Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Nevada, West Virginia,
and Wyoming are currently experiencing a medical liability crisis. Id. at 10-22.
181.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 5; Hebeisen, supra note 37, at 27.
Joell Babula, Medical Liability Company Requests Premium Increase, LAS
182.
VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 11, 2003 at 2B; Joell Babula, State Insurance ProgramHolds Off On
Lowering Rates, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 14, 2002 at lB.
183.
Mass. Doctors Decry Latest Malpractice Hike, INS. J. (May 18, 2004), at
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/eastU2004/05/18/42338.htm; Ralph Ranalli,
Malpractice Plan Would Limit Trials, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2003, at Al, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/11 /13/malpratice-plan-would limit trials/.
184.
Julie Kay, Medical Malpractice; Despite Legislation that Promised to Rein in
Physicians' Insurance Premiums, Three Finns File for Big Rate Increases, PALM BEACH
DAILY Bus. REV., Nov. 20, 2003, at 10.
185.
David Schrag, Malpractice Costs - Fixing Blame, MORNING J., July 18, 2004, at
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the Mississippi to in droves. 188 If caps work, why are these states on the
AMA's so-called crisis list?
Other cap states faired no better during this latest "crisis" period. In
Maryland, a cap state since 1986, rates increased by 60% in the last two
years. 89 In Utah, a cap state since 1996, rates for internists increased
between 25% and 35% in 2002.190 In Alaska, capped since 1997, one
medical center reported that its rates increased by 326% from 2001 to
2003.191 Undoubtedly, the experience of these states shows that caps don't
reduce doctors' premiums. In fact, the experience of cap and non-cap states
during "crisis" periods shows that there is no correlation between damage
limitations and malpractice rates, and thus, "taking away the rights of the
most seriously ' injured
in our society has been and continues to be a failed
92
public policy."'
Here in Illinois, as soon as caps were passed, ISMIE raised rates more
than 20% on corporate and partnership accounts, 193 and then announced
another 25% increase for the 2006-2007 premium year. 194 It also announced rate increases for seven medical specialties ranging from 5.9% to
22.2%.' 9' All physicians in Jackson County will suffer a rate increase of
11.1%, in Winnebago County 13.3%, and in Grundy County 20%.196 So,
while ISMIE misleadingly claims an average premium reduction of 5.2%
for the 2006-2007 year, this comes at the expense of a substantial number
188.
Hebeisen, supra note 37, at 27.
189.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 5; M. William Salganik, 33% IncreaseIn Malpractice
Premiums OK'd; Approval comes on top of a 28% rise this year; Heated-up reform debate
likely; Highest-riskspecialiststo pay $150,000 a year, BALT. SUN, Sept. 15, 2004, at 1D.
190.
WEISS, supra note 122, at 5; Berkeley Rice, Malpractice premiums: Soaring
again,MED. ECON., Dec. 9, 2002, at 51 available at
http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id= 116951.
191.
Voice of the Times: Insurance Rates Skyrocket," ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 20, 2003, at B7.
192.
DOROSHOW & HUNTER, supra note 143, at 6-7.
193.
Rate Hearings, supra note 50, at 83 (Sept. 27, 2005). Following the hearings on
ISMIE's proposed rate increases in September and November of 2005, the Illinois
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Division of Insurance, approved
ISMIE's requested 20% increase for corporate and partnership accounts, but ordered that
ISMIE: (1) freeze the average premium rate and target a rate reduction of 3.5% for premium
year 2006-07; (2) rebate excessive premiums received in policy years 2005-06 and 2006-07;
(3) give significant discounts to doctors who participate in educational programs designed to
improve healthcare; and (4) provide extensive and verifiable data on its rate making process
that the Division of Insurance can use to evaluate any future rate increase requests and make
this data available to the public and to other insurance companies seeking to write medical
malpractice policies in Illinois. Order of March 14, 2006 in Rate Hearings, supra note 50.
194. ISMIE Mutual Ins. Company, Highlights: 2006-2007 Premium Rates, April 5,
2006 at http://www.ismie.com/news/2006_0405_rates.pdf (last visited April 18, 2006).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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of doctors and medical corporations that will instead experience significant
premium increases. Thus, although claims paid have decreased by 14.3%
since 2003 and net earnings more than doubled from 2004, ISMIE intends
to raise rates on its insureds, even while giving some top executives pay
raises of as much as 33%. 197
XI. CAPS ARE MISDIRECTED AND UNFAIR

As demonstrated above, caps on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases do not protect physicians from the surging cost of
insurance premiums. However, medical societies and insurance companies
camouflage this truth, and instead point the finger at seriously injured
victims of medical negligence and the juries who evaluate their losses. The
medical societies and insurance companies demand legislative protection
under false pretenses, seeking to subsidize their mismanagement on the
backs of the most terribly injured, those who have already paid such an
enormous price. Instead of corporate welfare at the expense of victims'
welfare, government must pass legislation stringently regulating medical
liability insurers.
Not only are they misdirected and ineffective, but caps on noneconomic damages are terribly unjust. Caps penalize the few, depending on
who injures them and how severely. The misfortune of the draw determines whether the tort system makes a victim whole. But, the status of the
wrongdoer should not arbitrarily control whether the injured party is fully
compensated. For instance, someone who is severely injured through the
negligence of a truck driver is fully compensated for his pain and disability,
but someone who is severely injured through the negligence of a physician
is not. A patient severely injured by a defective medical device is fully
compensated for his pain and disability, but a patient severely injured by
the surgeon who negligently installs a safe medical device is not. Under the
new statute, a patient severely injured by a negligent physician is compensated to a lesser extent for his9 pain and disability than a patient injured by a
negligent hospital employee.'
Caps on non-economic damages unfairly impact on the unlucky few
severely injured by medical negligence, especially the young. An infant
catastrophically injured at birth with a seventy year life expectancy has
non-economic damages capped at $500,000, the equivalent of only $7,143
197. Bret Chase, Caps or No, Ill. Adds to Doc Totals, CRAIN's Cin. Bus., Sept. 11,
2005, at 1. The cap legislation had no effect on ISMIE's 2005 earnings or losses because it
did not effect pending cases. Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 111.Legis. Serv. 3440 (West).
198.
Public Act 94-677 caps a plaintiff's non-economic damages at $500,000 in suits
against a physician, but $1,000,000 in suits against a hospital. Pub. Act. 94-677, 2005 Ii.
Legis. Serv. 3440, 3461 (West).
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annualized over a lifetime. 99 On the other hand, a catastrophically injured
80 year old adult with a life expectancy of seven years receives the annual
equivalent of $71,430 in non-economic damages. The child must live far
longer with his pain and disability, never knowing a life without devastating
injury. Yet, the child is compensated for only one-tenth of his loss as
compared to the adult. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out,
"[y]oung people are most affected by... cap[s] on non-economic damages,
not only because they suffer a disproportionate share of serious injuries
from medical malpractice, but also because many can expect to be affected
by their injuries over a 60- or 70-year life expectancy. '' 20°
Caps absurdly discriminate between severities of medical injuries,
providing less protection to those who suffer greater harm. A patient who
is moderately injured and makes a complete recovery is fully compensated
for non-economic damages, but the severely injured patient who never
recovers is drastically under-compensated for non-economic damages.
"Plaintiffs with the most severe injuries appear to be at the highest risk for
inadequate compensation. Hence, the worse-off may suffer a kind of
'double jeopardy' under caps."20 ' The risk of loss is placed entirely on the
backs of this small number of innocent victims left with profound disabilities and shattered lives. Meanwhile, the profitable insurance industry and
well paid negligent professionals get undeserved and unneeded legislative
protection.202 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court keenly observed, "[n]o
rational basis exists for forcing the most severely injured patients to provide
monetary relief to health care providers and their insurers. 2 °3

199.
Illinois Civil Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 34.01 compels a jury to determine
the amount of damages, including non-economic damages that will arise in the future and
permits the jury to consider the plaintiff's life expectancy when determining these damages.
Non-economic damages are paid in a lump sum and the annual equivalents are for
illustrative purposes only. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, No. 34.01 (2005 ed.).
200. Ferdon,701 N.W.2d at 466.
201.
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203.

Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 466.

MalpracticeJury Verdicts in California,23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 65 (2004).
202. According to the Medical Group Management Association, Physician
Compensation and Production Survey, 2004 Report Based on 2003 Data, the national
compensation of a neurosurgeon at the 50th percentile is $644,683. Compensation is defined
as reported W2 or 1099 income after the deduction of operating expenses, such as
malpractice insurance, and does not include fringe benefits paid by the practice, e.g.,
retirement plan contributions, health insurance and automobiles. Medical Group Management Assocation, Physician Compensation and Production Survey, 2004 Report Based on
2003 Data (2004).
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XII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Illinois has twice held that caps on damages are
unconstitutional. In 1976, the Court decided Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital Association, holding that caps on damages in medical malpractice
cases are unconstitutional. Twenty-one years later, the court in Best v.
Taylor Machine Works held that caps on non-economic damages in bodily
injury and death cases are unconstitutional.
Nothing has changed since Wright and Best, except another lap around
the insurance industry's predictable economic cycle. Once again, medical
malpractice insurance companies temporarily lost money on their investments, hiked up premiums, and then blamed it on the seriously injured
medical malpractice victim. However, overwhelming evidence shows that
the recent surge in malpractice premiums is not causally related to damage
awards or indemnity payouts. Overwhelming evidence shows that caps on
damages in medical malpractice cases do not reduce physicians' premiums.
So why were caps enacted yet again? Medical liability insurers cleverly manipulated their books to mislead physicians, lawmakers and the
public into believing that Illinois is in the midst of another so-called
"medical malpractice crisis" caused by non-economic damage awards. The
deceived public is fearful of losing health care access, so lawmakers,
wanting to be reelected, pass so-called "reforms", while doctors' premiums
continue to skyrocket and medical malpractice insurers profit. This socalled "reform" is ultimately to the harm of those not backed by powerful
special interests and who are unaware that they will someday need the
protection of the courts, the seriously injured medical malpractice victim.

